This paper will explore som e difficulties with the concept of depression from the perspective of critical realism. W e have three aims. First, we will describe the variable, and som etimes incom mensurable, ways in which the diagnosis of depression has been defined and discussed in professional m ental health texts. Secondly, we will examine this confusion in relation to historical and cross-cultural work on em otions and distress. Thirdly, we will provide two case studies from social science which reveal the lim itations of conventional approaches to depression ± the research of George Brown and Lyn Abramson and their co-workers.
Introduction
Recent debates about psychopathology are characterised by two polarised positions. The first of these m ight be described as `m edical n a tu r a l ism ' a n d t h e se c o n d `so c i a l constructionism' . Medical naturalism, following Kraepelin, assum es that psychiatric nosology proceeds increm entally with a confidence that there exists a real and invariant external world of natural disease entities (Hoff, 1995) . The logic of this position is that these entities are studied by diagnosticians with increasing sophistication, leading to a m ore and m ore accurate description of reality. A variety of critics have argued that the absence of hard signs in psychiatry renders all of its functional diagnoses (i.e. m ost of the work of the profession) as problematic or mythological (e.g. Szasz, 1961; Ingleby, 1981; Boyle, 1990) . In the second position, following Foucault and Derrida, psychiatric diagnoses are studied as representations of a variegated and ultimately unknowable human condition. Mental illness, according to this approach, is a by-product of the activity of m ental health professionals (Parker et al., 1995) . According to this view, causal argum ents about m ental health or illness are seen as inherently problematic, and the study of psychopathology `itself' is replaced by a study of the ways in which psychopathology is represented or socially constructed. W ithin m edical sociology, constructionist critiques have also been evident about non-psychiatric illnesses (Bury, 1986) although, as with functional m ental illness, there has been a tendency to focus on conditions with contested or unknown aetiology, such as m ultiple sclerosis.
It is possible to take a third approach, which i n so m e r e sp e c t s l ie s b e t w e e n t h e se oppositional points of debate. This position, which can be called `critical' or `sceptical realism ' (Bhaskar, 1990; Greenwood, 1994) , shares with social constructionism the requirement that scientific and technical concepts be examined in the context of the social and historical conditions which allowed them to emerge. However, in contrast to the social constructionist approach, it does not assume that the study of psychopathology itself m ust give way to the study of discursive practices alone. Rather, the study of the social and historical context of concepts is seen as an indispensable strategy for replacing biased or m isleading concepts with ones which are m ore useful scientifically and clinically. In a critical realist account it is not reality which is deemed to be socially constructed (the axiom atic radical constructionist position), rather it is our theories of reality, and the m ethodological priorities we deploy to investigate it. Our theories and m ethods are shaped by social forces and inform ed by interests. These include interests of race, class and gender as well as econom ic investm ent and linguistic, cultural and professional constraints in time and space. These forces and interests invite form s of sceptical or critical analysis when we are asked to accept or reject empirical knowledge claims about reality. Thus deconstruction has a part to play in this exercise, but hum an science should not be reduced m ethodologically to this position alone. W e can, and should, m ake attempts at investigating reality in itself, but do so cautiously and critically.
In this paper we illustrate this approach by offering an exploration of emotions and emotional distress, focusing on the way in which the concept of depression has been employed in psychiatric theory. It is striking that psychiatric texts, despite asserting knowledge about `affective disorders' in general and depression' in particular, rarely include discussions about the general nature of emotions (Power & Dalgleish, 1996) . Even within psychology texts, when the emotions are addressed, discussion about their nature usually occurs in separate chapters from discussion of psychopathology. W e will argue that the incoherence of m any psychiatric accounts of depression becom es understandable when this literature is examined.
Professional represen tations of depression
W ithin the psychiatric and clinical psychology literature, there are a variety of positions taken about what constitutes depression. In som e texts, no working definition is offered at all, although a range of symptom s are explored. This approach is evident in the writings of som e biological theorists (e.g. Golden & Janowsky, 1990) as well as som e who are m ore psychologically orientated (e.g. Beck et al., 1979) . This failure to provide a clear definition implies that the concept of depression has a self-evident validity. However, closer inspection reveals that different authors assign primacy to different psychological phenom ena when writing about depression. For example, som e texts insist that it is prim arily a disturbance of m ood and that all associated phenom ena are secondary to this affective state (L ewis, 1934; Becker, 1977) . Others focus prim arily on cognitive features. Perhaps m ost influential in this latter respect has been Beck and his colleagues, who have argued that the depressive experience is characterised by a negative view of the self, the world and the future (Beck et al., 1979) .
In an attempt to avoid assigning prim acy to one particular feature of depression som e writers have argued that depression is a `Syn-drome not a sym ptom and this syndrom e requires the presence of several sym ptom s' (Montgom ery, 1990, p. 31) . In accord with this assum ption, DSM-IV (Am erican Psychiatric Association, 1994) requires the presence of depressed m ood and four other sym ptom s before `m ajor depression' can diagnosed. Other psychiatric definitions include looser or m ore arbitrary inclusion criteria. For example, in one standard text it is stated that:
In the clinical context the term depression refers not simply to a state of depressed m ood, but to a syndrom e comprising m ood disorder, psychom otor changes and a variety of som atic and vegetative disturbances. All of these changes m ay be present but none includin g d ep ressed m o o d is e sse n tia l... (W illner, 1985, p. 3, emphasis added) . In another text it is stated that, `T he word depression is used in m any ways to describe a m ood, a sym ptom, a syndrom e... as well as a specific group of illnesses...' (Mendels, 1970, p.1) . Moreover, following the presentation of a list of sym ptom s, the text goes on to observe that:
The extent to which these sym ptom s are present and their com bination are infinitely variable: other sym ptoms are frequent and som etimes dom inate the clinical picture (Mendels, 1970, p. 6) . A similar `anything is possible' position can be found in accounts written by psychologists. For example, Davison & Neale (1990) provide a sym ptom checklist of nine points blended from the Am erican Psychiatric Association sources but then go on to note that a `...single individual seldom shows all the aspects of depression; the diagnosis is m ade if at least a few signs ( sic) are present... ' (p. 207) .
Of course, it is com m on in physical m edicine to find groups of patients with the same physical dysfunction (disease) who none the less report a range of experienced sym ptom s (illness). However, the diagnostic approaches to depression outlined above differ from those in physical medicine in at least two important respects. First, there appears to be no consistent transcultural, transhistorical agreem ent about m inim al necessary and sufficient pathognom ic criteria for the phenom enon of interest. For this reason, depression, like other functional psychiatric diagnoses such as schizophrenia (Bannister, 1968; Bentall et al., 1988) , is a disjunctive concept, potentially applicable to two or more patients with no symptom s in com m on. Secondly, as in the case of other psychiatric diagnoses, the diagnosis of depression is based exclusively on symptom s and not on signs. If it was possible to redefine depression in terms of unambiguous biological m arkers it would be possible to distinguish between those who were really depressed and those who just appeared to share som e experiences in comm on with depressed people. Of course, in redefining depression in this way, there would be a danger that the clinical concept of depression would becom e entirely divorced from the everyday concept of depression. However, this danger is not imminent because biological m arkers are ipso facto m issing for all functional diagnoses, including that of depression.
Drawing the line between depression and other phenom ena
One consequence of the ambiguity about what constitutes depression is a series of important disagreem ents about the dividing line between depression and other kinds of psychological states. For example, som e authors regard depression as a categorical concept, whereas others regard it as existing on a continuum with normal functioning. Taking the first of these approaches, Murphy (1982) notes that true `clinical depression' in the elderly m ay be difficult to distinguish from m ore com mon dysphoria. In contrast, som e cross-cultural psychiatrists have argued that each culture has varying criteria for describing everyday m isery and distinguishing this from abnorm al unhappiness (e.g. Klienm an, 1988 ). It appears that psychologists are more prone to assum e the continuous distribution of personality features and psychological functioning, including the depressive experience (e.g. Eysenck, 1977) , whereas psychiatrists are m ore likely to argue that illness is a category or discontinuous state (e.g. Kendell, 1975) . These biases probably reflect the professional socialisation of each group ± psychologists operate statistical assum ptions about experience and behaviour, whereas m edical practitioners are taught to distinguish norm ality from abnorm ality by emphasising diagnostic criteria. A fundamental basis of the social status of m edical practitioners is their unique claim to diagnostic rights. Accordingly, it is rare for doctors to abandon or problematise the latter. Similarly, psychologists accrue social status by their applied scientist role and so require a scientific rhetoric (about statistical reasoning) to maintain their professional m andate (Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992) .
The relationship between depression and anxiety is just as contentious as the relationship between depression and normal functioning. In som e texts, depression and anxiety are regarded as having such a com mon co-presence that a m ixed group of sym ptom s from each `condition' com e to constitute a single pathological condition. For example, the tenth edition of the International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10) describes a mixed anxiety depression syndrom e (W orld Health Organisation, 1992) . Psychiatric texts about prim ary care work also point to the comm on o cc u r r e n c e o f t h i s m ix e d c o n d i ti o n (Montgom ery, 1990). Some authors have therefore argued that the `neurotic' form s of depression cannot be distinguished from other neurotic disorders (Tyrer, 1990) or that it m ay be m ost useful to speak of a general neurotic syndrom e that can be m anifest with varying degrees of depression or anxiety (Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) . Researchers using factor analysis have som etimes attempted to resolve these disputes by classifying pathological emotional states in ways which differ m arkedly from ordinary language usage. For example, Clark & W atson (1991) have proposed a m odel which divides negative emotions into three factors: nonspecific negative affect, manifestations of som atic tension and arousal and anhedonia and the absence of positive mood.
There are also disputes about the dividing line between depression and m adness. It is usually assum ed that affective states can become psychotic if sufficiently severe, in which case they are accom panied by `lack of insight' or other psychotic phenom ena such as delusions and hallucinations. Kraepelin held that these psychotic form s of depression were distinct from dementia praecox (later renamed schizophrenia) and proposed the term m anic depression to describe both psychotic unipolar depression and depression accom panied by episodes of m ania, now known as bipolar disorder (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990) . However, this distinction was soon challenged by som e authors who argued that m ixed conditions are com mon and who suggested that the term `schizoaffective' m ight be used to describe such m ixed states (Kasanin, 1933) . DSM -IV (APA, 1994) distinguishes between schizophrenia, schizoaff ective disorder, m ajor affective disorder and bipolar affective disorder, each of which is divided into further subtypes. Although the term `bipolar affective disorder' implies that mania lies at the opposite end to depression on a spectrum of affect, phenomenological studies indicate that m anic patients report negative m ood as m uch as positive m ood (Goodwin & Jamison, 1990) .
Finally, there have been disputes about the relationship between depression and physical disease. Textbooks of psychiatry often point to the som atic features of depression (e.g. loss of weight, fatigue, loss of appetite), thus allowing the possibility of attributing these sym ptoms to depression in the absence of overtly negative mood or cognitive features. This ambiguity about the central role of somatic sym ptoms in depression is m ost evident in the debates which have surrounded the nature of `chronic fatigue syndrom e' (CFS) ± form erly known as `post-viral syndrome' or `myalgic encephalomyelitis' . Some authors have entirely rejected the view that CFS is even, in part, a psychological phenom enon (Ramsay, 1986) . Others have seen it as a form of hysteria or m asked depression (McEvedy & Beard, 1970) , whereas others have argued that it is caused by physiological dysregulation which, none the less, is affected by som e of the processes thought to affect depression. (For a review of the diverse competing theories about shared, separate and direction of etiology, in CFS and depression, see the Joint Royal Colleges Report (1996) .)
Given these confusions about its nature and boundaries, it is perhaps not surprising that Seligman (1973) has described depression as, `T he com m on cold of psychopathology, at once familiar and mysterious' . This description, while reflecting the fact that depression is the most com m on diagnosis assigned in psychiatric practice, acknowledges that the term belongs both to the technical vocabulary of the m ental health professions and also, like the com mon cold, to ordinary language. In order to understand the existing confusions, therefore, it is essential to know how both the professional and lay concepts of depression have emerged from their cultural contexts.
H istorical, cross-cultural and intra-cultural aspects of affect
The psychiatric concept of depression has its roots in three separate diagnoses which have now faded from the professional discourse. The first was m elancholia (a form of lunacy) and another was neurasthenia (nervous exhaustion). During the nineteenth century, a third notion, `m opishness' , was also found in comm on parlance along with m elancholia, but was primarily attributed to the lower classes (MacDonald, 1981) .
The rise of depression as a single term for negative emotional disturbance followed the demise of its three predecessors. Until the Napoleonic wars m elancholia was: `but a rag-bag of insanity states whose only comm on denom inator was the presence of few (as opposed to m any) delusions' (Berrios, 1995) but, by the m id-nineteenth century, it had been transform ed into a disorder of the emotions characterized by inhibition and a decline in function. The concept of `m ental depression' was introduced at this time as an analogy with `physical depression' , a term used to describe a decline in cardiovascular function. Its dom inance was assured by the later dissolution of `neurasthenia' following the theoretical challenges created by shellshock during the Great W ar (Stone, 1985) . This precursor of the currently preferred `posttraum atic stress disorder' subsumed a variety of sym ptom s including `hysteria' , `anxiety states' , `neurasthenia' , `disordered action of the heart' and `shell-shock' itself (putatively caused by the neurological traum a of exploding missiles).
Although m odern Anglo-Am erican psychiatrists consider neurasthenia to lack con-ceptual validity, the concept is still used in China, reflecting cultural differences of opinion about the relationship between som atic illness and depression (Kleinm an, 1988) . To take another example of these differences, in som e parts of the Indian sub-continent m isery is often expressed through reports of a fallen or painful heart. This observation has led western psychiatrists to claim that these patients are `really' suffering from depression and that they are m istakenly siting their grief behind their sternum . By contrast, m edical sociologists studying distressed Asian patients point out that depression is a recent W estern m edical representation, which has no inherent conceptual superiority to that of alternative descriptions of unhappiness from other cultures (Fenton & Sadiq, 1991) . Apart from the cognitive preferences and interests of W estern m edicine reifying concepts such as `depression' , its diagnostic concepts are shaped and reinforced by drug com pany m arketing and research strategies. This point is m ade with specific reference to `depression' by Healy (1997) and highlights one of our introductory points that economic forces at times m ay shape concept form ation and retention.
The problem of psychiatric diagnosis in different cultures can be understood by looking to m ore general cross-cultural studies of affect. Different societies using different languages use a wide but variable range of words to describe emotional states. W allace & Carson (1973) found over 2000 words describing emotions in English, although less than 200 are found in the vocabulary of m ost people. By contrast, Lutz (1980) found only 58 words used by the Ifalukians of Micronesia to refer to transient internal states. Howell (1981) found that the Chewong of Malaysia have only seven words which translate into English as emotional states. Russell (1991) , in a large review of ethnographic studies of emotions, found that some states which are described regularly by English speakers have no analogue in other cultures. For example, in som e African languages, the same word covers what would be described separately as `anger' and `sadness' in English (Leff, 1973) , whereas the Gidjingali aborigines of Australia do not discriminate `fear' and `shame' .
Prototypical emotions which play a central role in western descriptions of psychopathology m ay be entirely absent in other cultures. Thus Marsella (1981) found no word for depression' in many non-western cultures and Leff (1973) found no words equivalent tò anxiety' among Eskimos or Yorubas. Even when equivalent words do exist in two separate cultures, which m ight point to similar m eanings (e.g. Japanese words for `anxiety' and `depression' ), studies using word association or semantic differentials suggest that these experienced meanings are not always equivalent (Chan, 1990) . In his review, Russell (1991) concluded that we cannot even take for granted the pancultural meaning of facial expressions. Japanese and American subjects agree on `surprise' or `sadness' but not on `anger' or `fear' . Sometimes poor agreement is even found about which internal states are emotional. For example, the Japanese word `jodo' has been translated as the equivalent of the English word `emotion' (Matsuyama et al., 1978) but the range of states it describes in Japanese includes English equivalents of `lucky' , `m otivated' and calculating' .
Russell' s review of a range of ethnographic studies suggests that in a minority of cultures there is no collective word for `em otion' and that m ost cultures have idiosyncratic emotional descriptions. For example, the English speaker has no immediate empathy for, and, no precise translation of, the Germ an notions of angst or schadenfreude (hence our neces-sity to retain the words untranslated). Similarly an Arab speaker may not understand the notion of frustration. Som e cultures have m any variants of one emotion (they arè hypercognized' (Levy (1984) ) com pared to other cultural lexicons. By contrast a culture m ay have only one word for an emotion (it is hypocognized' ). These studies beg the question of whether there are any grounds for m aking a claim for universal emotional states. It could be argued that cross-cultural differences are so great that this task is doom ed. However, some m ethodologies, such as multi-dimensional scaling, point in a limited way to the existence of universal affective states. In this m ethod, informants are asked to rate the similarity of a range of emotion words. Ratings are then analysed using a statistical procedure which tries to account for them in terms of a minimum num ber of dimensions. This m ethod has been used to identify a broad two-dimensional m odel of universal emotions, `pleasure versus dysphoria' and `arousal versus sleepiness' (Russell, 1980; see Figure  1 ). This two-dimensional model also seems to produce consistent judgements about emotional states reported in photographs of facial expressions from varying cultures, including N orth Am erica, G reece, Spain, V ietnam , Hong Kong and Haiti (Russell, 1991) .
From these observations it can be concluded that social constructionism is correct to emphasize the cultural and historical relativism of first-person accounts of emotional states, but is incorrect when problematising all empirical claims about invariance in the reality and causality of m ental distress. Equally, m edical naturalism is correct to place an emphasis on empirical investigations of distress but incorrect in na-vely confusing culturally and historically specific professional concepts (in this case `depression' ) with invariant templates of reality. The map is never the territory and, in the particular case of `depression' , the map is extremely unclear. 
Differences between professional and lay accounts of depression
These cultural findings, together with the inconsistencies in the way that the term `depression' has been used by professionals, suggest that professional and lay uses of the term `depression' differ in a variety of ways (Pilgrim & Rogers, 1993, Ch. 1; Rogers & Pilgrim , 1997 ). Thus we have a second m ajor problem about the search for a universal lexicon of emotions ± we cannot even assum e consistency of m eaning within a culture, particularly when a restricted professional code is used about abnorm al emotional life by mental health experts. Similarities and differences between the two groups can be suggested as follows: 1. Professionals often assum e that trans-historical and trans-cultural consistencies exist about m ental illness whereas lay people express themselves about ordinary feelings and distress in a way which varies both across and within cultures. 2. Professionals claim a general pre-em inent and superior epistemological status for their descriptions. Lay people do not aspire to this pre-em inent position although they m ay expect that their idiosyncratic experience is taken seriously. The status of professionals is therefore bound up with their com petence at generating expert accounts which are m eaningful and transparent enough to be persuasive, but not so transparent that lay people can readily capture professional authority. 3. The social setting of professional diagnoses is not typical of the social settings in which emotions are experienced and emotional distress generated. A point diagnosis is a snapshot taken at one mom ent in a clinical setting using a type of lens owned by the diagnostician. By contrast a lay person' s experience of distress occurs within the context of their unique biographical fram e of reference and m ight be construed with reference to various aspects of their current, past or future life situation. 4. Professional accounts cannot be generated without reference to lay accounts about emotional distress. Lay people take up a range of views about professional expertise from trusting dependency to critical opposition. In between, som e lay people m ay understand, accept and partially internalise the professional discourse (a phenomenon de Swaan (1990) describes as `protoprofessionalisation' ). Because terms such as `depression' co-exist in both professional descriptions and in the vernacular, culturally specific representations of distress are sustained by the interaction between the discourses of lay people and professional healers. Analogously, as Kleinman (1988) observed, Chinese psychiatrists eschewed the diagnosis of depression in favour of neurasthenia just as m uch as their patients. Thus, confusion about the concept of depression within the psychiatric literature reflects a tension between lay experiences of emotions (which have both trans-culturally recurring and biographically unique features) and professional accounts. W hereas lay accounts of distress have specific parochial and temporal value for ordinary people, they do not aspire to universalise their particular attributed m eanings. In contrast, professional a c c o u n t s a ssu m e t h e u n i v e r sa l ( i .e . transcultural and transhistorical) validity of th e ir r e p r e se n ta ti o n s o f m i se r y ( su c h as`depression' ), an assum ption that, on reflection, m ay seem unwise.
This conflict between professional and lay accounts is likely to be particularly problematic in the context of research into emotional problems. W hen potential patients state that they are `depressed' , they are presum ably evoking the lay representation of depression because it best fits their subjective apprehension of their position on the em otional circum plex. For example, they m ay feel dysphoric and to som e extent either aroused (agitated) or sleepy (lethargic). Their selfreport will also be influenced by the extent to which their cultural representation of depression is concordant with other aspects of their current experience ± for example, feelings of low self-esteem or a lack of interest in events which would otherwise be pleasurable. To the researcher, this report of `being depressed' is translated into the professional representation of a discrete and universal emotional condition ± a diagnosis of `depression' . Brothers (1997) , a neuroscientist who has been sensitive to these kinds of difficulties, has recently shown how the assum ption of transculturally and transhistorically valid discrete emotional states has led to confusion in her field. She has argued that researchers have differed in their attempts to implicate particular structures in the limbic system in particular emotions, according to the different behaviours (elicited by brain stimulation or eliminated by ablation) which they have singled out as representative of those emotions. She has also pointed out that the changes in emotional behaviour observed in animals following brain stimulation or ablation depend on the social context in which the animal is placed. Finally, she has argued that m any of the assum ptions apparently supporting the m ore general hypothesis that the limbic system is the neurophysiological locus of emotion (that there are clear anatomical criteria for assigning structures to the limbic system; that these structures are exclusively involved in visceral regulation; that visceral changes are the basis of emotion) do not survive scrutiny. In her account, physiological researchers have been unable to achieve a m ore sophisticated understanding of the limbic system because they have accepted a na-ve naturalist account of emotional states.
It seems likely that research in psychopathology will have been affected by similar difficulties. In the rem aining sections of this paper we discuss two influential lines of research in which we believe these difficulties are evident.
The work of George Brown and colleagues on the social origins of depression
The work of George Brown and his colleagues has produced a highly sophisticated social m odel of `depression' , which subsumes a m ulti-factorial picture of past and present determinants within specifiable inter-personal, as well as, social situations. However, Brown has quite self-consciously evaded any pre-empirical consideration of the legitimacy of the diagnostic category of depression (see Brown & Harris, 1978, p. 20) and has m ade it clear that he believes that there is a biological substrate to an identifiable and diagnosable psychiatric condition which is different from everyday m isery ± depression' . Brown' s work can be situated within a Durkheimian tradition of sociological positivism which is highly com patible with m edical naturalism. Ingleby (1981) describes Brown' s work as a version of `weak positivism' because of its uncritical retention of a dubious diagnostic category, despite its exploration of the m eanings-in-context of distressed people. As a consequence of this, it fails to engage with the conceptual problems we have highlighted earlier, or with the points about cultural and historical relativism legitim ately raised by social constructionists. (Brown and his colleagues are still working on cross-national com parisons in which they export assum ptions about the universal applicability of western psychiatric nosology.) Paradoxically, the very determ inants the Brown m odel enum erates, which provide empirical evidence for the social causes of m isery, m ay be obscured by emphasising depression as a `real' medical condition. Indeed, the m edical diagnostic approach to depression individualises the very social processes and antecedents the m odel quite persuasively explores.
Brown' s work is most illuminating if the focus of attention is shifted from his chosen end-point (the diagnosis of depression) to the antecedent and situational factors which attend hum an misery. These have both political and psychological dimensions. For example, the inadequacies of m ale partners as sources of nurturance for women, and the tendency of the form er to entrap and hum iliate the l a t te r , m a y c r e at e w h a t B r o w n c a l l s depressogenic' effects (Brown et al., 1995) . However, this could be refram ed by simply stating that m iserable wom en live with oppressive m en. Similarly, sexually abused children are likely candidates for the later psychiatric diagnosis of depression (and others) (Browne & Finkelhor, 1986) , with these victims constituting up to half of the psychiatric population. Given this linkage, while it is possible to talk about `the diagnosis of childhood sexual abuse' and `the diagnosis of depression' in its survivors, it is less m ystifying to think about the enduring m isery created by the sexual oppression of children by adults.
The work of Lyn Abram son and colleagues on attributions and depression
Attributional theories of depression have evolved from earlier animal models, in particular Seligman' s (1975) learned helplessness theory, which argued that depression occurs when individuals have no control over their environment. Like m uch of the neurophysiological research discussed by Brothers (1997) , Seligman' s m odel therefore depended on identifying a particular class of animal behaviours as equivalent to an apparently discrete emotional state in hum ans. Faced by the observation that depressed patients often claim excessive responsibility for the m isfortunes in life, the theory was then m odified to include an attributional com ponent. According to the revised learned helplessness theory of Abramson et al. (1978) , depression therefore occurs when the individual experiences negative events as uncontrollable but also attributes them to causes which are internal to the self, stable over time, and global in their impact of areas of the individual' s life. Subsequent research indicated that depressed patients, on the whole, did m ake the expected attributions for negative events, but m uch less clearly indicated that attributions (especially of internality) were trait vulnerability m arkers for depression as the theory supposed.
In the wake of these inconsistent findings, Abram son et al. (1989) further revised the theory, and argued that attributions were distal causes of hopelessness, which was now considered the proximal m ediator of depressed m ood. They suggested further that the m odel was only valid for a subtype of depression, which was labelled `negative cognition' depression. In order to avoid the otherwise inevitable circularity of this position, Rose et al. (1994) compared depressed patients with a pessimistic cognitive style with those who appeared to lack this style, finding that the form er group were m ore likely to have a diagnosis of personality disorder, and were m ore likely to have experienced difficult or abusive relationships with their parents. These findings imply clearly that attributions play an important role in psychopathology, but do not provide a particularly com pelling case for allocating them a specific causal role in a subtype of depression. To com plicate m atters further, other researchers have shown that the so-called `depressogenic' attributional style is also observed in people diagnosed as suffering from anxiety disorders (Mineka et al., 1995) .
These disputes can be resolved by abandoning the idea that attributions are linked to a discrete and readily identifiable condition of depression. For exam ple, T ennen & Herzenberger (1987) showed that attributional style was predictive of self-esteem, and that the apparent relationship between attributions and depression disappeared when selfesteem was included as a covariate. This observation raises the possibility that other behaviours and experiences which are som etimes subsum ed under the label of depression m ay be accounted for by other m echanisms. For example, som e authors have argued that disruption of circadian rhythms is the core feature of depression (Healy, 1987) , but this would seem to be a better explanation of those sym ptoms which are sometimes described as `biological' (early w akening, fatigue and loss of appetite) rather than problems of self-esteem that appear to be associated with abnorm al attributions. The tangles which cognitivists have got themselves into, shown in this short section, have been a function of them accepting the concept of depression uncritically. Like other functional psychiatric diagnoses it is a professional reification about hum an m isery, not a fact. If the concept is not working as a coherent pre-empirical notion perhaps we should review its utility instead of generating m ore and m ore empirical studies producing m ore and more ambiguous findings about depression' .
Im plications for m ental health research and practice
W e have argued that the contemporary western m edical notion of `depression' is confused, woolly and inadequate as a basis for form ulating mental health problems. W e have also argued that two m ajor epistemological positions about psychological dist r e ss ( m e d i ca l n a tu r a l ism a n d so c i a l constructionism) do not provide adequate practical solutions to the problems created by this conceptual incoherence. W e have suggested that a third or m iddle position of critical realism is a more helpful approach to m ental health problems, as it ensures a proper caution about historical and cultural relativism, without degenerating into the unending relativism and nihilism attending social constructionism (Bhaskar, 1990 , Greenwood, 1994 Pilgrim & Rogers, 1994; Busfield, 1996) . This position respects empirical findings about the reality of m isery and its m ultiple determinants but does not collapse into the na-ve realism of m edical naturalism. It accepts causal arguments but rem ains sensitive to the relationship between empirical m ethods and pre-empirical (e.g. professional) interests and social forces.
One implication of our analysis concerns research. Given that the concept of depression is insufficiently narrow to allow the specification of cognitive and biological m ediators of distress, it m ay be necessary to focus research on m ore narrowly defined behaviours and experience, for example low self-esteem, fatigue and anhedonia, experienced in specific social contexts. However, we have also argued that the concept of depression is insufficiently broad to allow a full exploration of the social and political conditions which contribute to human m isery, and that the current focus on a psychiatric diagnosis m ay m ystify and obscure these conditions. For these purposes, therefore, a m uch broader concept of human m isery m ay be required as well, allowing sociological or social-psychological studies which focus on the supra-individual phenom ena associated with fam ily, social and work life.
A second implication of a critical realist view of m isery concerns problem form ulation and intervention. The current outcom e literature on the treatment of `depression' suggests that m any therapeutic approaches are helpful, but that a com bination of antidepressant m edication and cognitive±behav-iour therapy is the m ost efficient treatment option (e.g. Klerman et al., 1994) . This conclusion, if valid (and Fisher & Greenberg (1997) dispute the findings about the efficacy of anti-depressants), may be explicable in terms of a `blunderbuss' approach. Antidepressants have a fairly non-specific effect on negative mood as well has having anxiolytic effects (Goldberg & Huxley, 1992) . At the same time, the positive connotations about reality encouraged by cognitive±behaviour therapy serve to reverse demoralisation and demotivation. W hile it is not surprising, then, that a biological and cognitive pincer approach seems to be effective, com pared to no treatment, when helping m iserable people, the danger of these reductionist approaches to treatment is that they m ay m ystify the oppressive social conditions which generate the distress experienced by the patient ± the technical fix of treatment m ay obscure our pathways into m isery. For example, insecure work and poor task control increase the risk of psychological distress in workers (Marm ot et al., 1991) and unemploym ent raises the probability of both dem oralisation and suicide (Fryer, 1995) . The point diagnosis (or `identification' ) of `depression' in individual patients will never reveal these relationships, which require social not psychiatric m ethods of inquiry.
Instead of focusing on the end-point diagnosis of `depression' , therapists m ight seek idiosyncratic form ulations of the antecedent and current conditions (including the patients' s individual attributed meanings) which have shaped the patient' s expression of this m isery. Signs of this approach are already evident within therapeutically orientated from s of com munity psychology (e.g. Holland, 1979 ) and in fem inist therapy (e.g. Eichenbaum & Orbach, 1982) . However, because of the latter' s psychodynamic roots, it has been criticised for still being prone to psychological reductionism (Busfield, 1996; Pilgrim , 1997) . A m ore holistic understanding would attend to the social determinants of m isery and would involve exploring the patient' s individually attributed meanings. This would be similar to the current practice of cognitive±behaviour therapy (CBT ), but would also involve applying the lessons learned from the work of Brown and his colleagues, together with other evidence about antecedent stressors explored in other sociological research on health and quality of life. In its traditional form CBT is also prone to psychological reductionism, as it singularly focuses on the patient' cognitive processes, implying that reality is not a problem, only the way we construe it. (L ogically these are not mutually exclusive ± we do not have to only problemetise one or the other, both/and are possible.)
In order to avoid the pitfall of victim blaming in the psychodynamic and cognitive treatm ents of `depression' , attributed m eanings and external reality need to be attended to in equal part. This would require a therapeutic flexibility which responds to the experienced distress of different individuals from different circum stances. It would not target casualties at the expense of exploring the sources of distress, and it would not take for granted the validity of the shifting diagnostic con-cepts of contemporary psychiatry, such as depression' , which have been shaped by particular social and cultural contexts and becom e dubious reifications.
